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I. LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The parties to this appeal are the petitioner, Beehive Telephone Company, the 
respondent, Utah Public Service Commission, and possibly the enforcement arm of 
the Commission, the Utah Division of Public Utilities. 
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IV. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
I "1 lis Court has jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals pursuant to I Jtal i. 
Code Annotated, section / 8 2 2(3)(e)(i) 
enforced, by the Utah Public Service Commission (the "Commission o* i * >•. "I JPSC") 
against Beehive Telephone Company ("Beehive"). 
On April 10, 1,997, the Commission fined Beehive $182,500. The following 
issues are presented by the imposition of this fine. 
a \* rl lethei tl le fine was imposed in violation of due process of law? 
I: ' i hetl lei the violations that were predicates to imposing »r tiu- ;u.o were 
j: i :: > ed, c :>f isistel it • itl I tl lei i lies :: f tl le Conn ' 
1:5otl i of tl iese issi les, n I Beel irv e's \ ie \ \ 
by ' this Coi n t i 10 deference shoi lid tx1 jn1 
Commission. Seef e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (I Jtal i 1981). 
On November 3,1999, the Commission enforced the fine of $ 182,500 entered 
earlier on Api ill 10. 199 / I he following issues are presented by the enforcement of 
tl lis fii ie 
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a. Whether, in the event the April 10,1997, order imposing the fine is reversed, 
the November 3, 1999, order enforcing the fine also should fall; 
b. Whether the enforcement action leading to the November 3,1999, order was 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations; 
c. Whether the Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the 
enforcement action leading to the November 3, 1999, order; 
d. Whether the enforcement action leading to the November 3,1999, order was 
in the nature of a criminal contempt proceeding, entitling Beehive to constitutional 
protections such as trial by jury; and 
e. Whether contempt was proved respecting the April 10, 1997, order as 
justification for enforcement of the fines in the November 3, 1999, order. 
All of these issues, in Beehive's view, pose questions of law, and on review by 
this Court no deference should be given to the analysis or ruling of the Commission. 
See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, 636 
P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
Beehive has reproduced in an addendum to this brief all those constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules that may be determinative of the outcome of these 
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consolidated appeals. These provisions, statutes, and rules include the following. 
I nited States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause 
I Jtal 1 Constitutioi 1, Due Process Clause 
i Ill if CI I: iptei 1\ A I i! li 5 54 i )f1 1 le I Jl \ tl I C < - I- i ' • 
Utah Public Service Commission Rule R746-100-10 I;. 1. 
VII. NATURE OF THE CASE 
WITH RELEVANT FACTS AND 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
Beehive is a small telephone company. It serves remote areas of rural Utah A 4 
the time of the proceedings that led to tl lese consoliaateu appeals, Beehrv e haa ouu 
iisloiiu'ifi yvt/ir sci IIJCS siitiiuiU ill in 1 
Thesr r nsolidatc * > r ;^ . technically from three but essentially <r " * i 
orders of the Commission, il icsc orders imposed and then enforced fines upon 
Beehive for violating quality of service standards and tariff rules. The fine amounts 
originally were enormous, but since have been reduced. Even as reduced, however, 
they are grossly disproportionate to .|.r \ HMatiun> involved. More important, the 
manner and process by x\ 1 lie! i the fines were assessed and ei lforced reflect an abuse oi 
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administrative power that must be reversed by this Court. 
The first order was entered by the Commission on April 10th, 1997 (hereinafter 
called the "April 10th Order"). This order, without prior notice, imposed penalties in 
the amount of $ 182,500 against Beehive. The penalties were imposed on account of 
violations that never were proved and, in any event, were not willful. The second 
order was entered by the Commission on November 3rd, 1999 (hereinafter called the 
"November 3rd Order"). This order purported to enforce the previously imposed 
$182,500 fine against Beehive. It likewise was unlawful and unwarranted for a 
variety of reasons. Probably recognizing the flaws in its procedures and rulings, by 
subsequent order dated February 5,2002, the Commission reduced the $182,500 fine 
to a $15,000 fine. Beehive believes that this reduction in amount does not cure the 
deficiencies outlined below. Since the analysis for both the November 3rd Order and 
the February 5,2002, order is the same, for convenience hereafter, both orders will be 
referenced as the November 3rd Order. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Beehive will narrate the factual and procedural background to the orders at 
issue in the case in two stages. The first stage involves entry of the April 10th Order 
originally imposing the $182,500 fine. The second stage describes circumstances 
leading to the November 3rd Order enforcing the $182,500 fine. 
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1. Imposition of the $182,500 Fine 
On July 8, 1996, the Utah Division of Public Utilities ("Division" or "DPU"), 
filed a petition for an order to show cause against Beehive. The Division's petition is 
reproduced at Petitioner's Appendix, pages 1-18 (hereinafter cited as "Appendix" with 
page numbers). The petition, in part, was a response to complaints from customers of 
Beehive in the Rush Valley, Terra, and Vemon service areas. The petition also was 
prompted by a complaint from the Commission itself, presumably pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, section 54-4a-l(l)(c).l 
The petition averred that (1) Beehive's quality of service was inadequate 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 54-3-1, (2) Beehive was committing billing 
errors, failing to comply with Commission Rule R746-240-4, and (3) Beehive was 
charging subscribers improperly for certain landline calls to cellular phones, which 
allegedly was contrary to the terms of the applicable Beehive tariff. 
Respecting the quality of service issue, Beehive was not accused of violating 
l Section 54-4a-l(l)(c) empowers the Division to "investigate or study, upon 
complaint, upon order of the Public Service Commission, or upon its own initiative, 
any matter within the jurisdiction of the [public service] commission." (Emphasis 
supplied.) The Division's petition for an order to show cause notes that, "On March 
18,1996 the Division received a Commission utility complaint request to investigate 
subscriber complaints [against Beehive]." Appendix, page 2. Thus, the Commission 
invoked its executive power of utility investigation to direct the Division to proceed 
against Beehive. 
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any specific service standard, only the general provisions of section 54-3-1.2 
Respecting the tariff issue, the Division's concerns were prompted by a 
complaint from a Beehive subscriber in Vernon, Mr. Kent Sagers. Appendix, page 6. 
Mr. Sagers claimed that he was charged toll or long distance rates for placing calls to 
Toole within a so-called "Extended Area Service11 zone where local rates should 
apply. Appendix, page 6. The calls were placed from a landline or wireline phone to 
a cell or wireless phone. This was said to violate Beehive's tariff. Appendix, page 
10. The form of complaint prepared by Division staff, however, confirmed that toll 
charges sometimes may be assessed when local exchange circuits are used to capacity 
2 Section 54-3-1 provides that: "All charges made, demanded or received by any 
public utility, or by any two or more public utilities, for any product or commodity 
furnished or to be furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be 
just and reasonable. Every unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or 
received for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared 
unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, 
instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote the safety, health, comfort 
and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all 
respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and regulations made by a 
public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the public shall be just 
and reasonable. The scope of definition fjust and reasonable* may include, but shall 
not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of customer, 
economic impact of charges on each category of customer, and on the well-being of 
the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such 
products, commodities or services, and means of encouraging conservation of 
resources and energy." (Emphasis supplied.) The underlined portion of this statutory 
mandate contains the language relied upon by the Division in the petition for an order 
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- in so-called "overflow" circumstances: "Toll charges between Vernon and Tooele 
would only apply only [sic] on an overflow basis and only when the customer dials 1 -
801- etc." Appendix, page 6. In subsequent testimony, Division staff ratified this 
interpretation of the Beehive tariff. Appendix, page 237 (testimony of Krystal 
Fishlock, Division auditor). And the tariff does contain language justifying this 
interpretation: "During heavy EAS calling times, circuits may not be available. 
Customers may use [long distance] circuits . . ." Appendix, page 10. The Division 
complaint also notes that there were no allegations of overcharges until March of 
1996: "This is the first month these calls have been toll rated by Beehive." 
Appendix, page 6. 
For relief or remedy, the Division's petition prayed the Commission to order 
Beehive (1) to "rectify the above referenced service problems," Appendix, page 2, (2) 
to "explain" the reasons for the putative irregularities in billing practice, Appendix, 
page 3, and (3) to "cease and desist" the practice of assessing toll charges for certain 
cellular calls, Appendix, page 3. The Division's petition did not aver that Beehive's 
conduct was tantamount to willful disobedience to any Commission mandate. Nor 
did the petition seek the imposition of fines, penalties, or sanctions against Beehive. 
On July 23, 1996, the UPSC granted the petition that it had invited from the 
to show cause. Appendix, page 2. 
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Division and issued an order to show cause. This order is reproduced at Appendix, 
pages 19-33. The order essentially parrots the Division's petition, and directs Beehive 
to appear before the Commission's administrative law judge for the purpose of 
"formal investigation and adjudication." Appendix, page 23. The order nowhere 
suggests that Beehive's conduct is in any way contumacious. Indeed, the order notes 
that, by letter dated July 12, 1996, Beehive desires to have the air cleared through a 
hearing. Appendix, page 23. The order nowhere states that willful disobedience to 
Commission regulations, fines, penalties, or sanctions are to be issues in the case. 
On August 16, 1996, the administrative law judge, A. Robert Thurman 
("ALJ"), issued an order that directed the Division and Beehive to appear at a pre-
hearing conference. Among other things, parties were requested "to come prepared to 
define the precise issues, factual and legal, to be heard[.J" Appendix, page 34. 
Beehive did not appear through counsel during the pretrial and trial phases of 
this proceeding. Beehive's usual counsel, Mr. David Irvine, was engaged throughout 
the late summer and entire fall of 1996 as campaign manager for a political candidate 
in the first district congressional race. Beehive was represented throughout the 
pretrial and trial of this matter through a lay person, its chief executive officer, Mr. 
Art Brothers. 
On September 4, 1996, the ALJ entered another order for the Commission, 
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requiring the Division and Beehive to submit a joint statement of trial issues and a 
discovery schedule in light of those issues. Appendix, pages 35-36. This order also 
noted the entry of another order by the Commission, providing for the protection of 
Beehive data that might be deemed confidential or proprietary in nature. This 
protective order notes that the contest between the Division and Beehive was to be 
treated as an "arbitration." Appendix, page 38. Because of the significance of this 
protective order to later stages of this contest between the Division and Beehive, it is 
reproduced entirely in the Appendix at pages 37-46. 
On September 11,1996, the Division submitted a statement of issues, pursuant 
to the September 4th order referenced above, noting areas of agreement and 
disagreement respecting what would be triable before the ALJ. Although the 
Division's statement of issues is detailed, there is no indication that the proceeding 
involved either an arbitration or an adjudication of willful violation by Beehive of 
any state law or Commission rule or that fines, penalties, or other forms of sanction 
would be at issue at the trial. Appendix, pages 47-48. On September 30, 1996, 
Beehive filed a supplemental statement in this regard, mainly echoing the areas of 
disagreement outlined in the Division's pleading. Beehive's supplement likewise 
gives no inkling that willful misconduct, fines, penalties, or sanctions are at issue in 
the proceeding. Appendix, pages 49-51. Meanwhile, on September 26, 1996, 
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AT&T determined to become involved in this proceeding. The Division's original 
petition had identified the blocking of toll calls and the inability to dial 800 numbers 
as quality of service issues. Appendix, page 2. These problems may have stemmed 
from too few circuits to handle this traffic. A dispute existed between long distance 
carriers and wireless carriers such as AT&T and local exchange carriers such as 
Beehive concerning responsibility to provide additional circuits in this regard. 
Underscoring this stalemate, a customer, Randy Faber, filed a complaint with the 
Division against AT&T and Beehive respecting the sufficiency of circuits available to 
handle in-coming long distance traffic to his local business. The Faber complaint, in 
essence, notes that AT&T and Beehive appear to have a dispute over responsibility in 
supplying these circuits, and that telephone customers should not be caught in the 
middle. Appendix, page 52. AT&T accordingly filed a petition to intervene in the 
Division/Beehive quality of service docket. Appendix, pages 53-55. Beehive 
conditionally assented to this intervention. Appendix, page 56. 
On October 7, 1996, the ALJ held a status conference in the proceeding. The 
transcript of this hearing may be found at the Appendix, pages 57-71. At this 
conference, the issues were sifted and refined to 6 and, according to the ALJ," . . . 
[A]t this point, I think we?re going to limit the proceeding to those six issues." None 
of the 6 included any question respecting fines, penalties, or sanctions against 
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Beehive. Appendix, pages 64-65. The primary issue, in the eyes of the ALJ, was the 
tariff issue; this was viewed essentially as a legal question that would require 
extensive briefing, presumably because of difficulty and debatability. Appendix, 
page 65. Discovery cutoff was fixed at November 1, 1996. Appendix, page 68. 
Hence, from the time the Division had identified the issues to be tried, September 
11th, or from the time the ALJ had limited those issues, October 7th, the parties were 
given at most 2 months and at worst 24 days to conduct discovery in the case. 
On October 9, 1996, the outcome of this conference was memorialized in an 
order (styled "Ruling and Notice") that granted the petition of AT&T to intervene, 
and identified with specificity and "limited" the issues to be resolved in the 
proceeding. Appendix, pages 72-74. Consistent with prior pleadings and orders in 
the case, this "Ruling and Order" nowhere raised any question respecting 
contumacious behaviour by Beehive or fines, penalties, or sanctions for any such 
behaviour. Appendix, pages 72-74. The "limited" language is found at Appendix, 
page 72. 
Promptly after the AT&T intervention was allowed by the ALJ on October 7th, 
Beehive served AT&T with data requests on October 9th. Appendix, pages 87-88. 
These requests sought information from the wireless division of AT&T that would 
have been relevant to the tariff debate raised by the Division. Appendix, page 88. 
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AT&T, however, refused to answer these requests for information. On November 1, 
1996, Beehive moved to compel, emphasizing the link between AT&T wireless and 
the tariff question, and at the same time requesting postponement of the trial, then set 
for mid-November, absent production of the information sought from AT&T and vital 
to Beehive's defense in the case. Appendix, pages 89-90. Rather than produce the 
information requested by Beehive, on November 1,1996, AT&T moved to withdraw 
from the case. Appendix, pages 91-93. As noted below, this motion for withdrawal 
was granted. 
On November 1, 1996, the Division filed a pre-hearing position statement in 
this proceeding. Appendix, pages 75-86. This pleading addresses only the tariff 
dispute referenced above, but is important for a variety of reasons. 
Like all of the pretrial pleadings and orders in this proceeding, it nowhere 
suggests that either willful disobedience of Commission protocols or fines, penalties, 
or sanctions for any such disobedience are at issue. 
Indeed, the Division's pre-hearing position statement describes the tariff 
dispute in terms that belie any argument for wilful disobedience. According to the 
Division, during an era when wireless telecommunications carriers were regulated by 
the UPSC, the relationship between wireline companies, like Beehive, and wireless 
providers (such as AT&T Wireless, Appendix, page 76) that interconnect with 
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wireline networks had been resolved through negotiated so-called joint provisioning 
agreements that, in turn, were subject to Commission approval. The nature, scope, 
terms, conditions, and approvals for such agreements had been the subject of "months 
of negotiations and hearings" in a separate UPSC docket prior to 1991. Appendix, 
page 77. Indeed, "The charges that [wireless] customers would pay for joint network 
use was highly controversial during the negotiations." Appendix, page 78. 
In this regard, Beehive's concerns were that (a) it had not been a party to the 
pre-1991 docket, and, therefore, should not be bound by whatever "precedent" may 
have been set in this docket, (b) it had no negotiated, Commission approved 
agreement with wireless carriers that would compensate Beehive for use by these 
wireless carriers of the Beehive network, and, indeed, had been refused such 
agreements by cellular carriers, and (c), in any event, a wireline call to a cell phone 
might well be a toll call even though the wireline customer called a cellular prefix 
within EAS because, as the Division acknowledged in its position statement, "In 
reality, the cellular customers almost always have a larger geographic local calling 
area than the wireline customers because of the transmitter/receiver area of coverage." 
In other words, EAS calls from land lines to cell phones in this instance might be a 
means of bootstrapping or "bridging" from the local calling area to a toll area, in 
effect, obtaining long distance service at local rates. This practice of "bridging," 
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which the Commission has disapproved on other occasions, in itself might be 
considered discriminatory, unjust, or unreasonable within the meaning of the public 
utilities code. Appendix, pages 164-167. 
On November 12,1996, the hearing on the order to show cause was held before 
the ALJ. Relevant excerpts from the hearing transcript, marshalling evidence 
relevant to the tariff dispute in particular, are found in the Appendix at pages 94-168. 
Tariff-related testimony is found in the Appendix at pages 102-105, 107, 109-110, 
112-116, 118-120, 125, 129-135, 146-150, and 164-167. 
Very little if any admissible testimony was presented by the Divison respecting 
tariff violations, and this evidence, viewed in the context of other data from the 
regulators, was inconclusive at best. All testimony was hearsay, since no billings 
were introduced into evidence. Other than the double hearsay reference in the Sager 
complaint, noted above, there was no evidence respecting the timing of 
commencement of alleged tariff violations. There was no evidence at all concerning 
the dates, time of day, duration, or number of violations. Indeed, some testimony 
suggested that there were no tariff violations in the sense of billing and collecting 
more than the tariff allowed because something was blocking the ability of 
subscribers to dial the cellular prefixes, requiring customers to place the calls as toll 
calls. Most important, as noted above, the Beehive tariff allows for the assessment of 
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toll charges when EAS circuits are used to capacity, during so-called "overflow" 
periods. The Division, on the record, admitted this exception to the EAS rule, and the 
Division submitted substantial evidence at the hearing to show that there were many 
hours of each day that the Beehive system was in an "overflow" mode. Appendix, 
pages 125 and 129-135. In light of the absence of specific evidence of the alleged 
time of tariff violations, taken together with the substantial evidence of continual 
overflow on the Beehive network, whether or not Beehive had committed a tariff 
violation in any given instance was impossible to determine from the record at hand. 
On the quality of service front, there was evidence that Beehive's lines had 
static and other transmission problems. Moreover the speed with which service 
problems were addressed was cause for concern in some instances. The Division 
acknowledged, however, that the standards for reform in this regard, such as 
installation of new lines, upgrading of switching equipment, reporting procedures, 
and the like, were being newly minted by Division staff, and, in some instances, even 
as late as the hearing date, had not been discussed with Beehive's management. 
Appendix, pages 135-145 and 168. 
The Division presented no evidence on the question of what is "just and 
reasonable" in relation to either the tariff charges or the quality of service — as 
required under Section 54-3-1 which provides, as quoted above in footnote 2, that 
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'The scope of definition 'just and reasonable' may include, but shall not be limited to, 
the cost of providing service to each category of customer, economic impact of 
charges on each category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; 
methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such products, 
commodities or services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and 
energy." In this regard, the Division presumably was relying upon the pre-1991 
docket and whatever findings may have been made therein as the evidentiary 
foundation for attacking Beehive's approach to the wireline/cellular joint provisioning 
issue. 
The issue of fines and penalties was raised at the hearing for the first time - but 
only as a possible, future enforcement tool. A Division witness, Peggy Egbert, 
suggested that it might be appropriate to provide for the possibility of fines in the 
order the Division was seeking from the Commission in the event Beehive did not 
keep the new quality standards the Division expected to be imposed as a result of the 
hearing. Appendix, pages 122-127. 
At the conclusion of the Division's case in chief, Beehive orally moved the ALJ 
for a continuance of the hearing, in order to allow Beehive further opportunity to 
prepare and respond to the position of the regulators. Appendix, pages 154-160. 
Among other grounds, Beehive indicated that, on the primary issue of tariff violation, 
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it had asked for specific data from the Division concerning contracts with US West, 
AT&T and others, as well as the number and nature of alleged offenses and the like, 
and that this information had not been supplied on discovery, and that, indeed, AT&T 
had been allowed to withdraw from the case on the eve of the hearing. Beehive also 
noted its confusion respecting what standards or rules it was expected to satisfy on 
the quality of service front as part of the order to show cause. Beehive further noted 
the threat of "monetary forfeitures," raised for the first time that day, as cause for the 
continuance. Appendix, page 157. In response to the motion to continue, the 
Division did not contend that Beehive had notice of the issue of fines. Nor did the 
Division maintain that there was notice respecting the definition of standards to be 
met. The Division simply argued that Beehive had been notified respecting the 
nature of the complaints from customers, the identity of those customers, and the like, 
and therefore should be prepared to go forward and defend. The motion for 
continuance was denied on the record by the ALJ. 
On December 3, 1996, after the hearing on the order to show cause had been 
concluded, Beehive made a written motion for additional time in which to defend. 
Appendix, pages 169-170. This motion also was denied by the ALJ. Appendix, 
pages 171-174. 
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After post-trial briefing, 3 on April 10,1997, the ALJ/Commission entered its 
"Report and Order" in this case. This is the April 10th Order. This Order is 
reproduced in the Appendix at pages 180-196. The Commission ruled that the 
conduct of Beehive mounted to a violation of Utah Code Annotated, sections 54-3-1 
and 54-3-7, and was sanctionable under Utah Code Annotated, section 54-7-5(2).4 
Indeed, the Report and order holds, as a matter of law, that "Each day of imposition 
of a charge not sanctioned by [Beehive's] tariff is a separate violation of [section] 54-
3-7, and is subject to the imposition of sanctions under [section] 54-7-5(2), UCA 
1953, as amended." Appendix, page 191. Thus, the Commission not only required 
Beehive to refund to subscribers all overcharges with interest, Appendix, page 192, 
but also fined Beehive $182,500 for the tariff violations — "$500 for each day 
[Beehive] has been imposing illegal charges." Appendix, page 194. 
3 Even during post-trial briefing, the Division did not argue that Beehive had engaged 
in willful misconduct or that it should be fined, penalized, or sanctioned by the 
Commission. The Division instead argued that, in the event tariff overcharges were 
found, Beehive should be required to cease and desist from this practice and to refund 
all such overcharges, with interest, to subscribers. Appendix, page 178. 
4 This statute provides, in pertinent part, that: "(1) Any public utility that violates or 
fails to comply with this title or any rule or order issued under this title, in a case in 
which a penalty is not otherwise provided for that public utility, is subject to a penalty 
of not less than $500 nor more than $2,000 for each offense. (2) Any violation of this 
title or any rule or order of the commission by any corporation or person is a separate 
and distinct offense. In the case of a continuing violation, each dayfs continuance of 
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The April 10 Order was the first mention in any charging document that 
Beehive was accused of violating section 54-3-7. Moreover, as shown from the 
elaboration of the procedural background given above, this was the first time in the 
proceeding that willful misconduct, fines, penalties, and sanctions were broached. 
Beehive moved for reconsideration of the April 10th Order. This motion was 
denied by the Commission. An appeal was taken to this Court. That appeal, by 
stipulation of the parties and order of this Court, was held in abeyance in light of the 
evolution of proceedings, described below, between the Division and Beehive at the 
UPSC. 
2. Enforcement of the $182,500 Fine 
After entry of the April 10th Order, time passed. Beehive installed a new 
switch and otherwise took steps to improve service in the Rush Valley service area. 
Indeed, Beehive bent its oars on all fronts, with all personnel, to adhere, point by 
point, to each and every service-related directive of the Commission. 
The April 10th Order also directed the Division to perform certain tasks. The 
Division was required, within 60 days of April 10th, to survey Beehive's customers to 
ensure compliance with the billing mandates of the April 10th Order. Appendix, page 
192. The Division also was required, within 120 days of April 10th, to survey 
the violation shall be a separate and distinct offense." 
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Beehive's customers "to ascertain the level at that time of customer satisfaction with 
[Beehive's] service." Appendix, pages 193-194. At subsequent hearings in this 
matter, the lead witness for the Division, Peggy Egbert, admitted that neither of these 
requirements was fulfilled as mandated. Appendix, pages 202-208. 
Over one year passed, and the statute of limitations for enforcement of fines 
and penalties imposed by the Commission, found at Utah Code Annotated, section 
54-7-20(2), expired. 
At this juncture, the Utah Attorney General's Office, acting as counsel for the 
Division, served a data request upon Beehive. Contrary to the rules of professional 
responsibility governing lawyers, this data request was not served upon counsel for 
Beehive. An auditor for the Division went to Beehive headquarters and found 
information suggesting that Beehive might still be charging toll rates on wireline calls 
to cellular phones in the Rush Valley/Tooele service area. Approximately $5,000 in 
questionable charges were involved. 
This information was presented to the Division which in turn confronted 
Beehive. Beehive indicated that, insofar as any tariff offense or violation of the April 
10th Order might be involved, this would have been a mistake, and offered to refund 
overcharges to relevant customers. As a precautionary step, Beehive in fact made this 
refund (with interest) promptly, even absent a showing that the charges in question 
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were illegal. 
Notwithstanding these circumstances, on October 13,1998, the Division filed 
another complaint with the Commission, alleging that Beehive had violated the April 
10th Order, and seeking enforcement of the fines, penalties, and sanctions theretofore 
imposed in the amount of $182,500. Appendix, pages 197-199. 
Although the Division's complaint charged only a violation of the tariff ruling 
in the April 10th Order, at the hearing on the complaint, commenced on short notice 
(within 3 months of the complaint and allowing only one month for discovery), the 
Division widened the scope of the inquiry to include all aspects of the Order. This 
was allowed by the ALJ over the objections of Beehive. 
Beehive defended on various grounds, procedural and substantive. As noted 
above, it demonstrated compliance with all service related and billing related 
requirements of the April 10th Order. On the question of tariff violations, Beehive 
argued that the statute of limitations for enforcement of the fines had expired, that the 
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try a contempt of its own order, that 
imposition of a fine in the amount of $ 182,500 was excessive in view of the $5,000 in 
alleged overcharges and especially in view of the good faith effort that Beehive had 
made in terms of overall compliance with the April 10th Order, a compliance that was 
proved conclusively at the hearing in question. Beehive also questioned whether the 
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auditor's information was admissible at trial, whether it proved a violation of the tariff 
or the April 10th Order, and, in any case, whether it was much mooted in view of the 
pre-trial refund of all questionable charges by Beehive to customers. 
After four days of hearings, ending March 24, 1999, and post-trial briefing, 
concluded June 16,1999, the ALJ took these issues under advisement. On November 
3,1999, the ALJ/Commission issued a "Report and Order." This is the November 3rd 
Order. It is reproduced in the Appendix at pages 242-247. The November 3rd Order 
held that the Division had failed to prove service/billing violations sufficient to 
justify enforcement of penalties against Beehive, but that the $5,000 in tariff 
overcharges required imposition of the $182,500 fine. 
Beehive moved for reconsideration of the November 3rd Order and this motion, 
under the applicable statutes and rules, was deemed denied. Beehive accordingly 
appealed from the November 3rd Order to this Court. After this appeal was taken, the 
Commission in fact agreed to reconsider the November 3rd Order, taking the matter 
under advisement for an extended time period. After due deliberation, on February 
5, 2002, the Commission granted reconsideration, reducing the fine, but otherwise 
affirming the November 3rd Order. This ruling may be found in the Appendix at 
pages 248-250. Beehive appealed the February ruling to this Court. 
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VIII. SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Beehive contends that the fine imposed under the April 10th Order is void as 
violative of due process of law. There was no notice that fines would be at issue in 
this proceeding. In concluding, as a matter of law, that Beehive was guilty of a tariff 
violation, the Commission held that Beehive was bound by a docket to which it never 
was a party. In concluding, as a matter of fact, that Beehive had violated the tariff, 
the Commission relied entirely upon hearsay evidence, contrary to its own rules of 
procedure, as well as due process. The admixture of functions, legislative, executive, 
and judicial, between the Commission and the Division also offended due process. 
Beehive also maintains that the April 10th Order should be reversed because, 
contrary to the report of the Commission, 365 days of tariff violations were not 
demonstrated (365 days x $500 per day = $182,500). Indeed, not a single day of 
violations was demonstrated. And nothing at all was shown by the "clear and 
convincing" evidence required, under Utah law, to prove a violation and impose a 
fine under the relevant statute. The Commission merely assumed in the abstract that 
violations occurred. Basing fines upon assumptions in the abstract far exceeds the 
jurisdiction and power of the Commission under the relevant statute. 
Beehive contends that the November 3rd Order (as well as the reconsidered 
order) is void because it is predicated upon the April 10th Order which, as argued 
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above, is void. 
Moreover, The November 3rd Order should be reversed because the 
enforcement action to obtain that Order was commenced after the applicable statute 
of limitations had expired. 
In addition, the November 3rd Order should be reversed because the 
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a penalty that it previously 
had imposed. 
Furthermore, the November 3rd Order should be reversed on constitutional, 
especially due process, grounds. 
Finally, the November 3rd Order should be reversed because a violation of the 
April 10th Order was not proved and hence there was no basis for enforcing the 
$182,500 fine. 
A. The Imposition of Fines and Penalties 
In the April 10th Order Violated Due Process 
The Commission violated the due process rights of Beehive in 4 different 
particulars. Beehive believes that, for the most part, the Commission violations of 
due process are obvious and do not require supporting citations. Nevertheless, as 
general support for Beehive's analysis of these particulars, given below, Beehive 
refers the Court to the extensive literature treating fines by administrative agencies, 
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and the constitutional protections, including the rights to notice and juries, that should 
be guaranteed to regulated entities such as Beehive. See generally, Charney, "The 
Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases," 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974); Cheh, "Constitutional Limits on Using Civil 
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the 
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction," 42 THE HASTINGS L. J. 1325 (1991); Clark, 
"Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional 
Analysis," 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976); Gellhorn, "Administrative Prescription 
and Imposition of Penalties," 1970 WASH. U. L. Q. 265; Murphy, "Money Penalties 
-- An Administrative Sword of Damocles," 2 SANTA CLARA LAW. 113 (1962); 
Nelson, "Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties," 4 THE WESTERN 
POL. Q. 610 (1951); and Thomforde, Jr., "Controlling Administrative Sanctions," 74 
MICH. L. REV. 709(1976). 
1. No Notice. Parties to judicial or administrative proceedings in this state are 
vouchsafed procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution as well as under the Utah Constitution. Due process means fair 
procedure. The keystone of fair procedure is adequate notice. In administrative 
proceedings where fines or penalties are to be imposed, parties should be given notice 
that this contingency may materialize. While parties often debate how much notice is 
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fair notice, no one would argue that a complete paucity of notice is fair notice. See, 
e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 832 (1994); 
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 
(1974); Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162,167 (1965); zndln re Oliver, 337 U. 
S. 257,273 (1948). See also, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 579 (1975) and Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). Moreover, no one would 
contend that a party may be penalized for violating an order, rule, or standard that had 
not yet come into existence, or did not exist with sufficient clarity to be understood or 
followed. See, e.g., Trinity Broadcasting of Florida v. FCC, 211 F.3d618 (D. C. Cir. 
2000); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D. C. Cir. 1998); 
General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-1329 (D. C. Cir. 1995); Satellite 
Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D. C. Cir. 1987). Cf Yates v. United States, 
316 F.2d 718, 723 (10th Cir. 1963); Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Association 
v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 69 (10th Cir. 1942). 
The record in this case is clear: from commencement of the action via the 
order to show cause in July, 1996, through issuance of the April 10th Order, Beehive 
received no notice that fines or penalties were at issue. Had Beehive been apprised of 
the possibility of a fine in the amount of $182,500, it surely would have taken a 
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different approach to the proceeding. It would have obtained counsel.5 It would 
have asked for more than one month in which to conduct discovery. It would have 
insisted upon the completion of discovery from the Division prior to the hearing 
November 12, so that cross-examination of Division witnesses could have been more 
effective. Indeed, as noted above, it would have obtained the data necessary to 
ascertain what, if any, calls were made, when they were made, and whether they were 
made at times of overflow or over-taxation of EAS circuits within the meaning of the 
exception language under the Beehive tariff— all with a view to refuting the abstract 
assumption of tariff violations later posing as a finding in the April 10th Order. It 
would have prepared and presented a case on the issue of willfulness, since this is an 
element of any claim for fines or penalties under the statute. It would have required 
5 Even when fines were not an issue in the case, during pretrial proceedings, the 
Division itself questioned whether Beehive should be represented by its CEO, Art 
Brothers, rather than counsel. Appendix, page 61. But see Appendix, page 156 and 
pages 164-167. A UPSC rule reportedly allows utilities to act through officers 
without counsel when appearing before the Commission. Appendix, page 61. 
Whatever the provenance of this rule, it may not pass muster under Utah law. See, 
e.g., Tracy-Burke Associates v. Department of Employment Security, 699 P.2d 687 
(Utah 1985); Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, 350 P.2d 616 (Utah 1960); 
and Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634 (Utah 1944). And similar rules have been 
challenged in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Idaho State Bar Assfn v. Idaho Public 
Util. Com'n, 637 P.2d 1168 (Idaho 1981) and Denver Bar Association v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 391 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1964) {en banc). Beehive's only concern 
at this juncture, however, is with the due process implications of the Division and 
ALJ and Commission allowing Beehive to act without counsel if they knew, at the 
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greater formality in the proceeding and precision in the presentation of evidence and 
the findings of the Commission. It may have argued entitlement to certain 
constitutional protections that arguably are available to respondents in contempt-type 
proceedings. 
What is more, it is clear from the testimony of the Division witnesses, Ms. 
Egbert and Mr. Fuller, supplied in Beehive's Appendix, that the service regulations 
(insofar as they were used as justification for the imposition of the fine) were newly 
minted. Indeed, Ms. Egbert testified that some of these were "in the works," even as 
the hearing was being conducted. The April 10th Order confirms this fact by calling 
the reporting compliance procedures "Draconian." Surely Beehive may not be fined 
for violating regulations that are "in the works" at the very hearing being conducted 
to consider the propriety of creating such rules and whether to make them applicable 
to Beehive. 
The Commission and Division may argue that, since the $182,500 fine was 
imposed but suspended, the due process rights of Beehive were not injured. It is 
doubtful whether actual injury must be shown in order to obtain reversal of the order 
in this respect, but in any event the injury, even from a suspended fine, is apparent. 
This amount, $ 182,500, even as a contingent liability, may have a material impact on 
time, without disclosing the same to Beehive, that a $182,500 fine was in the offing. 
32 
the balance sheet of a small company such as Beehive, and, as such, may affect the 
ability of Beehive to borrow or otherwise operate as a business. This seems 
especially true if the shelf life of such a fine is more than one year. As shown below, 
the Commission and Division take the position in this case that the duration of such a 
fine, even if suspended, may be indefinite. Moreover, the power that such a fine, 
especially one of undetermined duration, gives to the regulators over a utility may be 
considerable. There is always the threat, implicit in the suspended fine, that, unless 
the utility is willing to go along with the regulator's requests, in all areas of 
administration, an excuse may be found to trigger enforcement of the suspended 
penalty. Regulation, in the final analysis, is about power, and the suspended fine, in 
this respect, may skewer and distort the relationship between Commission and utility. 
2. No Separation of Functions. In performing their duties, administrative 
agencies sometimes function in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity. When 
these functions are combined in a single proceeding, however, abuse often results and 
this may offend due process. This Court has warned that such a failure to separate 
functions may result in a due process violation. See, e.g., In re Discliplinary Action 
ofMcCune, 717 P.2d 701,706 (Utah 1986) ("[i]t would have been a clear violation of 
state due process had bar counsel investigated, prosecuted and then participated as a 
judge in the adjudication of this case[ ]"); Utah Department of Business Regulation, 
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Division of Public Utilities v. Public Service Commission, 614P.2d 1242,1250-1254 
(Utah 1980). 
This combination of powers, with attendant abuse and violation of due process, 
occurred in this proceeding. The Commission acted legislatively by imposing new 
service standards, including what it described as "Draconian" reporting requirements. 
The pricing docket for joint provisioning services between wireline and wireless 
companies also represents the exercise of legislative power. See, e.g., Mountain 
States Tel & Tel Co. v. Public Serv. Comfn, 155 P.2d 184, 187-188 (Utah 1945). 
The Commission acted in an executive capacity when it ordered the Division to 
police or investigate the customer complaints against Beehive, and when it directed 
the ALJ to do likewise. The Commission put on its judicial hat when it made legal 
rulings respecting the tariff violations and imposition of fines. Indeed, the assessment 
of fines, like a citation for contempt, is a quintessential judicial function. The 
Commission acted as executive when it sought to enforce the fine in the November 
3rd Order that it had imposed judicially in the April 10th Order. During this entire 
process, the Division, as an arm of the Commission, not only was serving as 
policeman and enforcer, but also, as a matter of official Commission/Division policy 
was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity as mediator of complaints between customers 
and Beehive pursuant to formal Commission Rules. Appendix, pages 209-230. 
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Beehive submits that it is inherently, fundamentally unfair to have the same agency 
that makes the rules at the same time investigate, police, prosecute, and adjudge 
violations and impose fines in relation to those rules. 
Indeed, Beehive believes that the power to fine is, like the power to sentence, a 
judicial function, and reposing this power in the Commission, standing alone, violates 
separation of functions, separation of powers, and hence due process principles. See, 
e.g., Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1, State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1998); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994); Tite v. State Tax 
Commission, 57 P.2d 734 (Utah 1936); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). Compare, Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1997)(parole determinations are not an exercise of the power of sentencing 
which is a judicial function). See also, Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 
(Minn. 1999). Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950). See generally, 
Utton, "Constitutional Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Functions by 
Administrative Agencies," 7 NAT. RES. J. 599 (1967). 
3. Bound by a Docket to Which It Was Not a Party. The Commission ruled 
that the tariff issue presented primarily a question of law, and, adopting the argument 
of the Division, concluded that Beehive was bound by the determinations, factual and 
legal, in a prior docket involving the pricing of joint provisioning arrangements 
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between wireline and wireless companies. There was no record evidence that 
Beehive was a party to this prior docket. The Division made no request that the ALJ 
take judicial notice respecting findings of fact from that docket. Since the 1991 
docket was a pricing docket, the Commission probably was acting legislatively, not 
judicially, and hence the principels of resjudicata or collateral estoppel, as applied to 
agency rulings (a fairly complicated area in its own right), would not appear to 
govern in any respect. But the invocation of these principles in this fashion in this 
case against Beehive surely offends due process. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson 
County, U. S. (1996) and Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940). Cf. 21 C. 
Wright & K. Graham, Jr., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, section 5106 
(Supp. 2001) and M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 
1491 (9th Cir. 1983). 
4. Imposing a Fine Based Upon No Evidence or Only Hearsay Evidence, 
The Commission finding respecting tariff violations that led to imposition of the 
$182,500 penalty, at best, was based entirely upon hearsay, a result expressly 
forbidden by the Commission's own rules of procedure. See, e.g., Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959); Commission Rule 
R746-100-10 F. 1. This may be ascertained from a review of the April 10th Order and 
the footnoted citations to the hearing transcript. Appendix, pages 184-185. (These 
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evidentiary matters are discussed in greater detail below.) For the most part, the 
Commission merely assumed, without evidence or proof of any sort, that the tariff 
violations were committed each and every day for an entire year, since this is how the 
fine was calculated. Appendix, pages 191, 194, and 249 (365 days x $500 per day = 
$ 182,500). Indeed, since the Division's complaint indicated that violations could not 
have occurred prior to March, 1996, and since the hearing with evidentiary 
submissions closed in November, 1996, it is plain that the Commission assumed 
violations for the period from November, 1996, through March or April 1997, a 
period of time when, by definition, no evidence of violations could have been 
submitted or demonstrated. Beehive contends that it violates due process to base a 
fine for $182,500 exclusively upon hearsay submissions, especially when the 
agency's own rules forbid such a result. Beehive also contends that, where a 
$ 182,500 penalty is concerned, it offends due process to base that penalty upon non-
record assumptions. 
B. The Fines and Penalties Imposed in the 
April 10th Order Should Be Reversed 
Because No Willful or Other Tariff Violations Were Shown 
This Court has ruled that, whenever the UPSC imposes a fine for violation of 
an ordinance of the utilities code, it may do so only upon proof of the violation that is 
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"clear and convincing." Wycoff Company v. Public Service Commission, 369 P.2d 
283 (Utah 1962). Although the Commission's procedural rules permit the receipt of 
hearsay into evidence (but forbid the making of findings that are based exclusively 
upon such hearsay), it is doubtful that hearsay evidence would satisfy the "clear and 
convincing" standard. It is even more doubtful that a $182,500 fine, based upon 
findings supported exclusively by hearsay, in contravention of the Commission's own 
rules, would satisfy this clear and convincing standard. 
The April 10th Order purported to "detail" the evidence supporting each of the 
alleged tariff offenses committed by Beehive. Appendix, page 181. In connection 
with the tariff offenses, the evidence relied upon by the Commission came from two 
witnesses, Larry Fuller and Larry Russell. Appendix, pages 184-185. The Fuller 
testimony cited in the Report and Order is an unsworn statement that describes the 
manner in which cellular companies, not Beehive, charge customers in the Rush 
Valley, Vernon, and Terra communities. Even if this testimony were relevant to the 
question of Beehive's alleged overcharges, at the outset of the hearing, the ALJ had 
noted on the record that unsworn statements could not be used to make findings. 
Appendix, page 97. Russell's testimony was sworn, but confused. He thought he was 
being charged wrongfully for cell calls to his landlinephone. Appendix, page 110. 
Of course, Beehive has no relationship to these charges. 
38 
Even assuming that Russell had testified that he had been charged wrongfully 
for calls from his landline phone to a cell number within the local service area, this 
would have been based upon a billing document that was not taken into evidence or 
reviewed by the ALJ. Absent this billing document (an out of court statement), the 
description of the bill by Russell would have been hearsay. 
Putting questions of hearsay aside, however, there was no proof of any sort that 
Beehive had overcharged customers under the tariff for every single day for an entire 
year. Yet the Commission made this assumption in imposing the fine. 
However faulty the Commission's analysis of the record at the hearing, 
Beehive does not deny that there was some testimony at the hearing relating to some 
aspect of the claim of tariff overcharges. As noted above, Beehive has marshalled all 
of this testimony in its Appendix. But none of this testimony is other than hearsay. 
Therefore, under the Commission rules, no finding is allowable based on any of it. 
None gives us a date, time, or amount for overcharges. And dates and times were 
essential to find a violation of the Beehive tariff, since that tariff, as all admitted, 
permitted toll charges during overflow periods, that is, when the EAS circuits were 
being used to capacity. In this regard, the regulatory evidence undercut any finding 
of violation, since Peggy Egbert, the Division's lead witness, introduced a traffic 
study of the Beehive circuits showing that they were indeed on overflow status much 
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of the time. Appendix, pages 125 and 129-135. One cannot know whether the toll 
calls were made within the overflow period, thus coming within the exception 
language of the Beehive tariff, without pinpointing the time of these calls and cross-
referencing those times to the overflow analysis in the Division's traffic studies. 
Moreover, there was no testimony presented that addressed the element of 
wilfullness, an element that must be proved in order to support the imposition of a 
penalty or fine. Indeed, it is clear from the argument in the proceeding that the tariff 
issue was treated as a legal issue, not one of fact wherein wilfullness or other 
motivation would have been shown. And the question of law and regulatory policy 
was described by the Division itself as controversial and therefore, presumably, one 
upon which open minds reasonably could disagree. This is not the stuff of 
willfulness or contumacious conduct. In short, there was no evidence at all, certainly 
no clear and convincing evidence, supporting the claimed violations and imposed 
fines. This probably is why the Commission resorted to assumption, even assuming 
violations for a time period, November, 1996, through April, 1997, after the trial and 
outside the record. The fines imposed in the April 10th order clearly exceeded the 
power of the Commission under section 57-7-25. 
40 
C. The Fines Enforced in the November 3rd Order Must Fall 
Because They Are Based Upon the Fines Imposed 
In the Fallen April 10th Order 
The November 3rd Order enforced the $ 182,500 fine arising from the April 10th 
Order. Since the fines imposed in the April 10th Order, as argued above, must be 
reversed on the basis of due process and evidentiary concerns, there is no predicate 
for the fines enforced in the November 3rd Order and the enforcement of fines in that 
order also must be reversed. Cf. Hyde Construction Company v. Koehring Company, 
388 F.2d501, 511 (10th Cir. 1968); Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 501, 511 (10th 
Cir. 1968). See generally, Dobbs, "Contempt of Court: A Survey," 56 CORNELL L. 
REV. 183,216-218(1971). 
D. The November 3rd Order's Enforcement of a Fine 
Must Be Reversed Because the Commission 
Lacked Jurisdiction to Enforce the Fine 
And Because, In Any Case, the Enforcement Proceeding 
Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations 
Title 57 of the Utah Code mandates a specific procedure for the enforcement of 
orders (and, in particular, orders involving penalties) by the Commission and against 
utilities. This procedure dictates where an action for the recovery of penalties shall 
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be commenced, who must bring it, and the deadlines for filing. The Division has 
ignored these requirements with consequences that are fatal to the November 3d 
Order. 
The Division's complaint in the fall of 1998 sought to recover the penalty 
amount ($ 182,500) conditionally mandated in the April 10th Order. The Commission 
receives power to assess penalties in chapter 7 of title 54 of the Utah Code. In 
particular, this statutory empowerment is found in Utah Code Annotated, section 54-
7-25. The April 10th Order, in the amount of penalty assessed and the manner of 
assessment, clearly is derived from the provisions of subparts (1) and (2) of section 
54-7-25. Chapter 7 of title 54 likewise delineates the procedures for enforcing such 
assessments and recovering such penalties. In this regard, section 54-7-18(1) states 
that: 'The courts of this state shall consider, hear, and determine all actions and 
proceedings under this chapter/' that is, chapter 7, which, as noted above, regulates 
the recovery of penalties from utilities. (Emphasis supplied.) 
While section 54-7-18(1) addresses the forum requirements for the recovery of 
penalties from utilities, section 54-7-29 regulates the parties who may bring such 
actions. Section 54-7-29 provides that: "Actions to recover penalties under this title 
shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. In any such action all penalties 
incurred up to the time of commencing the same may be sued for and recovered. All 
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fines and penalties recovered by the state in any such action, together with the cost 
thereof, shall be paid into the state treasury to the credit of the General Fund. Any 
such action may be compromised or discontinued on application of the commission 
upon such terms as the court shall approve and order." (Emphasis supplied.) 
This statutory regime is plain enough: Actions respecting the recovery of 
penalties, according to the language of section 54-7-29, shall be brought in the name 
of the state of Utah. The last sentence of section 54-7-29 clearly implies that the 
Commision shall be the petitioning party, since the Commission alone is empowered 
to discontinue or compromise the action for recovery of penalties. Section 54-7-29 
makes clear, moreover, that any action to recover penalties must be commenced in 
court. This follows, not only because it is impractical if not inappropriate for the 
Commission, as a regulatory body, to seek enforcement of its order before itself, as a 
judicial or quasi-judicial body, but also because the text of section 54-7-29 empowers 
the Commission to discontinue or compromise actions for recovering penalties only 
"upon such terms as the court shall approve and order." 
The reference to court approval in the last sentence of section 54-7-29, 
furthermore, brings us full circle to the language of section 54-7-18(1), quoted above, 
which requires that actions for the recovery of penalties under chapter 7 of title 54, as 
well as all other actions involving that chapter of the utilities statute, shall be brought 
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in state courts. Section 54-7-18(1) again echoes the requirements of section 54-7-29, 
moreover, by providing that, in all proceedings where "the commission or the state of 
Utah is a party" and in which "any question arises ... under or concerning any order 
or decision of the commision[,]" the matter is to receive priority on the court's 
calendar. 
Finally, Utah Code Annotated, section 54-7-20(1) provides that complaints 
against a utility on account of illegal charges or unreasonable service shall be brought 
before the Commission, and that the Commission then is empowered to deal with 
these complaints, and where appropriate, after due investigation and hearings, to enter 
orders for reparation and the like. Subpart (2) of section 54-7-20 addresses questions 
of noncompliance with Commission orders which are entered pursuant to subpart (1) 
of section 54-7-20. For example, section 54-7-20(2) provides that, where an order for 
reparation has been made by the Commission, and the utility fails to comply with this 
order, "suit may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the 
same." Section 54-7-20(2) also requires that "all complaints for the enforcement of 
any order of the commission shall be filed in court within one year from the date of 
such order." (Emphasis supplied.) The language of section 54-7-20(2) thus 
reinforces the statutory directives, noted above, in sections 54-7-18(1) and 54-7-29, 
that actions to enforce orders which impose penalties are a matter for judicial 
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oversight rather than administrative regulation. In addition, section 54-7-20(2) 
prevents parties from seeking enforcement after the expiration of one year from the 
date of the order. 
The November 3rd Order must be reversed in light of the provisions of chapter 
7 of title 54. The April 10th Order had to be enforced and the $182,500 penalty 
recovered, if at all, in state court, and not before the Commission. This enforcement 
action should have been brought in the name of the state and controlled by the 
Commission, not the Division. On the facts in our case, such an action, in any event, 
would be time-barred. While Beehive has not found any Utah cases which explicate 
this statutory requirement, it is not difficult to discern the legislative rationale. 
The power to regulate is an amalgamation of power which includes the 
authority, not only to promulgate laws in a legislative capacity, but also to adjudicate 
disputes, sometimes involving those same regulations, as a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body. These powers often are conjoined with the power to investigate and prosecute 
as well. As citizens, we rightly are suspicious of the powers of the state, and 
especially when those powers are reposed in a single body, undiluted, unseparated, 
without check or balance. The Utah legislature, in chapter 7 of title 54, wisely has 
hedged the power of the Commission respecting penalty contempt actions. Where the 
Commission once has entered an order which imposes penalties, it may exercise 
45 
discretion to determine whether the prosecution of a proceeding for contempt is 
warranted or wise, but it may not also act as investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury 
of that contempt, all in one. Parties faced with a petition for the recovery of a 
penalty, previously imposed, are entitled to have this controversy resolved through 
the neutral mediation of a judicial body, rather than by the administrative agency 
which imposed the penalty in the first instance. Viewed in this light, chapter 7 of title 
54 may be a legislative antidote, insofar as actions for the recovery of penalties are 
concerned, to the perennial conundrum of separation of functions in administrative 
law. The statute also may represent an effort to avoid certain pitfalls under the due 
process requirements of federal constitutional law. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel. 
Vuitton et Fils S. A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 
485-86 (1972).6 
6 The statutory scheme in chapter 7 of title 54 nowhere provides that this separation 
of functions and impartial mediation may be supplied through an administrative law 
judge, as distinct from courts outside the administrative agency. For whatever 
reasons, the legislature apparently did not believe that hearings before an ALJ would 
guarantee independent judicial review to the degree desired in actions for the 
enforcement of orders and recovery of penalties. The legislature may have believed 
that, even where an ALJ decides a question regarding enforcement or recovery in the 
first instance, under the review provisions of Commission regulations, the ultimate 
arbiter of these issues still will be the Commission as a whole, and hence, in the final 
analysis there is no real escape from the quandary over separation of functions. In 
addition, the legislature may have resolved that, even if the ALJ is an answer to the 
problem of separation of functions, the due process rights, rights to trial by jury, and 
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The provisions regulating jurisdiction and standing in chapter 7 of title 54 
likewise may be the product, not only of legislative caution in the face of otherwise 
unbridled administrative power, but also a matter of restraint to forestall the 
transgression of other constitutional boundaries. The Division complaint sought 
recovery of $182,500, but made no statement respecting disposition of this amount, 
once recovered. We are left to presume that the penalty would be paid to the benefit 
of the Commission or the Division, as an aid to further regulatory efforts. Section 54-
7-29, as quoted above, however, is particular in requiring the payment of fines "into 
the state treasury to the credit of the General Fund." By requiring that actions for the 
recovery of penalties be brought in the name of the state, and further, that penalties 
recovered be paid into the general fund, section 54-7-29 vitiates any suspicion that 
enforcement actions may arise from the temptation to use the power to fine and the 
office to enforce penalties as a means to subsidize underfunded regulatory coffers. 
Cf. Wardv.Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972). Compare, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 
456 U. S. 188 (1982); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238 (1980). 
other constitutional rights vouchsafed to litigants and discussed below are best 
preserved through a judicial rather than an administrative process. The legislature 
accordingly dictated that only courts shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for the 
enforcement of orders and recovery of penalties from public utilities. 
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Finally, actions for the recovery of penalties, in essence, are actions in the 
nature of contempt proceedings. There always has been a concern that proceedings in 
contempt, reflecting the law of kings, as wielded by judges who are men, may too 
often be prosecuted as a means for private revenge rather than the public good. It has 
been said that "contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the 
most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament." Bloom v. Illinois, 
391 U. S. 194, 202 (1968). And "men who make their way to the bench sometimes 
exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to which 
human flesh is heir." Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 12 (1952). The 
combination of such men with a power which is at once "unbridled" and "liable to 
abuse" may be unfortunate in the extreme. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S., at 202. 
Public Service Commissions and Administrative Law Judges, as human beings, 
receive no special dispensation from these passions, and are equally susceptible to 
mistake private vindication for the exercise of judgment when faced with an alleged 
affront to their orders in a case. Indeed, some have argued that judges who act in a 
regulatory as well as a judicial capacity may be more prone to abuse power, and 
therefore would withhold the contempt authority from them altogether.7 
7 Justice Douglas, for example, once famously dissented from the promulgation of a 
rule of procedure which would grant the contempt power to bankruptcy judges. He 
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Since contempt proceedings (where fines are enforced rather than threatened 
only for coercive effect) may be in the nature of criminal proceedings, they raise 
concerns over constitutional rights such as the right to trial by jury, under either the 
sixth or the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, ej*., Bloom 
v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968). The standards for determining when these 
proceedings may be criminal, especially in the area of penalties under administrative 
law, are not precise, and often are difficult of application. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ward, 448 U. S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963). 
Even where the recover of penalties is civil in character, the right of trial by jury 
would be available under state or federal constitutional measures. 
In the face of these issues, it is not improbable that the Utah legislature opted 
for constitutional safety rather than administrative efficiency in the passage of chapter 
7 of title 54. Whether or not these constitutional questions were to the fore in the 
remarked: "I once knew most of the referees in the Nation and worked with them on 
various projects. But they, too, flourish under Parkinson's Law; and their power 
grows like that of a prince in a medieval kingdom. That may not be ominous when it 
relates only to administrative detail. But it is for me alarming to vest appointees of 
bankruptcy courts with the power to punish for contempt... Walter Nelles long ago 
reminded us that summary procedure of contempt is a 'legal thumbscrew/ the 'most 
autocratic of judicial powers,' and in practice the most indefinite' [citation omitted] 
... Extension of the contempt power to administrative arms of the bankruptcy court is 
not consistent with close confinement of the contempt powers." Bankruptcy Rules 
and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U. S. 991, 993, and 994 (1974) (J. Douglas, 
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minds of the lawmakers, on balance, the legislature may have believed that judicial 
oversight would be a worthwhile palliative to the risk of regulatory zeal, and that the 
opportunity to request peer review through jury trial would add to this protection. 
E. The Enforcement of the Fine in the November 3rd Order 
Was a Criminal Contempt, And Therefore Must Be Reversed 
Because Beehive Was Denied Constitutional Protections 
As indicated in the authorities cited above, assuming the enforcement of the 
fine were to be tolerated, this would be in the nature of a criminal contempt, and 
Beehive would be entitled to the entire panoply of constitutional protections available 
to defendants in this instance, especially the protection of trial by jury. Beehive did 
not waive these rights before the agency; indeed, Beehive demanded them over and 
over. Thus, even if the public utility code may be read to give the Commission 
jurisdiction to enforce an order for fines, this jurisdiction must be exercised, if at all, 
consistent with the jury trial and other constitutional rights available to defendants in 
criminal contempt proceedings. Moreover, Beehive restates and incorporates all of 
the separation of functions, separation of powers, and due process arguments made 
above respecting the April 10th Order by this reference in relation to its challenge to 
the November 3rd Order. 
dissenting). 
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F. The Enforcement of the Fine in the November 3 Order 
Must Be Reversed Because There Was No Proof 
Of a Contempt of the April 10th Order 
The Division failed to prove there was a tariff overcharge in violation of the 
April 10th Order, and hence there was no warrant for enforcing the fine in the 
November 3rd Order. 
The Division attempted to prove tariff overcharges through the testimony of 
Krystal Fishlock, a staff auditor at the DPU. It is undisputed that Ms. Fishlock 
identified the possibility of overcharges through Beehive records that were not 
introduced into evidence at the hearing. Her testimony in this regard was hearsay. 
No foundation was laid that would qualify Ms. Fishlock as an expert.8 Nor was there 
any foundation showing that the records at Beehive upon which she based her 
testimony would qualify under any exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, there 
simply was no non-hearsay testimony (let alone clear and convincing evidence) upon 
8 As noted above, the information that was used by Ms. Fishlock in her testimony 
was obtained from Beehive when the Attorney General's Office, acting as counsel 
for the Division, served Beehive, but not its counsel, with a data request. This 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct alone might warrant exclusion of 
the proffered testimony. Putting these ethical concerns aside, however, it is clear 
that the testimony was proffered in violation of the protective order earlier entered 
by the Commission in this proceeding. Appendix, pages 37-46. This is an 
additional reason for exclusion of the testimony. 
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which the Commission, under its own rules, could predicate a finding of violation of 
the April 10th order. 
What is more, Ms. Fishlock herself identified the provision of the Beehive 
tariff that permits toll charges during overflow periods, when the EAS circuits are 
being used to capacity. Her testimony in this regard was without foundation, based 
on hearsay or assumption, and therefore incomplete and inconclusive. It is 
impossible to determine from her testimony whether the charges she had identified as 
possible violations were made at a time when the EAS circuits were being overtaxed. 
Moreover, no evidence of contumacious conduct was presented by the Division. 
Finally, the pretrial voluntary refund of all possible overcharges, with interest, by 
Beehive, surely mooted or purged the question of violation or contempt of any 
Commission order. 
IX. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Beehive believes that the fines were entered in 
violation of due process and other constitutional guarantees, and asks the Court to 
reverse the orders of the Commission insofar as they assess, impose, or purport to 
enforce any such fines in whatever amount. 
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Dated this 20th day of September, 2002. 
Alan L. Smith (Utah Bar No. 2988) 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
31 L Street, No. 107 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801)521-3321 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Beehive Telephone Company 
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